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PHILIP NDEGWA 
This paper is really a number of excerpts fron a 
mueh more detailed and soon forthcoming work on 
inter-country trade and development policies in 
East Africa. Consequently, in this p cXp GUT 8. numb er 
of points are made without discussing them in 
detail, which would otherwise "be necessary. 
I. 
As is now well appreciated, the East African customs union has 
developed into a de facto common market. The East African. customs 
union was forme d through four main stages: in 1917 Kenya and Uganda 
agreed to have free trade in domestically produced goods and to 
amalgamate their customs authorities; in 1923 Tanganyika, although 
retaining a separate customs department, was brought inte the arrange-
ment; in 1927 free transfer of fureign imported goods was also aeeep-
ted; and in 1949 Tanganyika' s customs department was amalgsmated 
with that of Kenya and Uganda.-^ - Besides having free trade in "both 
domestically produced and imported goods, there have been very few 
restrictions on movements of labour wi.tb.in East Africa. Capital 
movements have also been free. The result is that a common market 
has developed, strongly aided by the fact that three countries 
have common "boundaries, share the same currency, and eperate a 
number of services (especially the Railways and harbours, pust and 
telecommunications, the income tax department, and customs and 
excise department) as Joint enterprises under the East African • 
Common Services Organisation (EACSO). In many ways therefore 
this economic integration is much closer than the one so far 
achieved "by the E.E.C. countries. 
In the established theory, economists have tended to discuss 
the effects of a customs union under the theoretical framework, set 
up by Jacob Viner, of trade creation and trade diversien effects 
of such'a union.2 If strictly limited to just assessing trade 
creation and trade diVersion effects, such an analysis is static 
•and would in most cases lead to the conclusion that if most under-
developed countries formed a customs union they would derive little 
benefit from it. This is not true, and if such a conclusion 
emerged, especially in the present world setting, we have good reason 
to question our theory, or at any rate the premises on which it rests. 
Rather, what needs to be done is to examine. the dynamic effects of 
such economic Integration: we need to examine the effects of the 
larger market on the growfch of «utput of the whole- areaj the possible 
economies of scale and consequent recucti'ons in costs; the possible 
1. For a good discussion on the historical development of this 
customs union see T.A. Kennedy, The East African Customs Union: Seme 
jjA.Histcary and Operation, Makerere Journal, No.4, 1959 
2. See Jacob Viner, The__Customs Union Issue, New York, 1950 
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diversificat ion of the economic activities of the area as a whole 
(and therefore possible improvements in its terms of trade); the 
eff'ect on efficiency and productivity through competition; and the 
effect of such economic Integration .on inflcw.of capital and-changes 
in entrepreneurs' outlook. It is also important to examine the 
effect of the economic integration on the development of each par-
ticipating country, for what might be true of the area as a whole 
need not "be true of each country. 
In this paper v;e do not have the time1 to go into all these 
aspects in dete.il; instead we shall limit our discussion to (a) 
the effect of the East African common market on the industrialisa-
tion of the area as a v/hole; (b) the effect of the common market 
on the development and industrialisation of each country; and (c) 
possible measures to maintain and iirprove the working of the common 
market - for it is now under serious strains and tensions. 
II. 
The Effect of the Common Market on the 
^d^taoali^^on^f^Eas t Africa 
One of the most serious limiting factors in the industriali-
sation process of underdeveloped countries is the small size of their 
domestic markets, for modern mass production of manufactured goods 
relies, to a very large extent, on large and stable markets. Mover-
over, the possibilitics of underdeveloped countries exporting manu-
factured goodsto the developed countries are very bleak indeed -
because such manufactures are produced on small-scale and therefore 
at high cost; they are initially produced by inexperienced indust-
rialists who have little knowledge of market patterns abroad and 
who cannot afford to conduct extensive and prolonged advertising 
campaigns or guarantee availability of spare parts; and, in any 
case, be.cause the developed countries levy stiff' tariffs on manufac-
tured goods coming from underdeveloped countries, with the rate of 
duty rising, in most cases, with the degree of sophisitication in-
volved in manufacturing e.g. processed primary products are taxed 
more than unprocessed ones. Eurthermore, developed countries can, 
if imports from underdeveloped countries rise substantially, impose 
the 'market disrijption clause' — a clause which is not well defined 
and which could nnly make sense if the production conditions in the 
exporting coimtry \rere truly abnormal, the products were sold at 
prices very much lov/er than those prevailing in the market generally, 
and if further imports of such goods had serious repurcussions in 
the importing country.^ 
Therefore, the size of the domestic market is of cruclal impor-
tance in the industrialisation of underdeveloped countries. For 
any country, the size of the domestic market depends. on two faictors 
essentially:' the country's pcpulation size, and the level of income 
per head of this population. The ldftter factor is now the more 
important one, but it is still true that the smaller the country' s 
.p.opulation the more permanent will be the constraint of small domes-
tic market on its industrialisation and development. However, 
although per capita income le.vel is the more 'important factor, the 
size of the population, at any givon level of income, is of some 
considerable importance: and economic integration in underdeve-
loped countries will .initally affect this factor, and will be fol- • • 
lowed, given other factors, by a rise in per capita income. But 
we need to observe that mere establishment of a common market or cus-
toms union among underdeveloped countries, while necessary in most cases, 
3. For a more detailed discussion on these factors see my paper, 
Freferential Trade Arrangements Amons; Developinp; Countries, Economic 
Development Research Froject, E.A.I.S.E. 
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is not a sufficient condition in securing industrialisation: the 
possibilities offered by such economic integration have to be exp-
loited, initially through establishment and protection of domestic 
industries designed to produce Substitutes for foreign imports. 
A good way of assessing the effect of the common market on 
the industrialisation of East Africa is to examine the growth of 
trade among the three countries (hereafter referred to as inter-
country trade) and its commodity composition. In Table la we 
show the value of East Africsn exports to herseif (i.e. inter-
country exports), exports to the Neighbours,^ and exports to the 
rest of the world - for 1954 and 1959 through 1963. In Table 
1 b we show these same exports as percentage shares of total East 
African c;ports. In Table 2 we show the coicmodity composition, by 
Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) sections, of 
East Af'rican inter-country exports, exports to the Neighbours, and 
exports to the rest.of the world for 1959 and 1963.® 
Prem Table la it will be observed that while inter-country 
exports have been increasing steadily, East African domestic exports 
to the Neighbours and to the rest of the world have been fluetuating 
and tended to stagnate until 1963. This is reflected in Table 1 b: 
here we notice that while the percentage share of intercountry exports 
in total East African exports was only 12. in 1954, by 1963 it had 
risen to 16.5/J, and in value terms increased by more than two-and-
half times. The fall in the percentage share of these exports in 1963 
(it was 17.4$!; in 1962)was not, of course, due to a fall in the real 
value: in fact their value increased by £4.7 million. This fall was 
due to the tremendous increase in the value of East African exports 
to the other two markets, especially the. rest of the world.® 
The growth of inter-country trade has been of importance in 
the development of East' Africa. Intor-country exports have increased 
from being less than of these countries' total monetary gross domestic 
produet (G-DP) in 1954 to nearly T/a in 1963. This is very important 
because underdeveloped countries are dependent, and therefore vulner-
able, economies because they depend on foreign markets and demand for 
the disposal of the goods which they produce. Consequently, when 
demand conditions change in foreign markets, underdeveloped countries 
are affected directly, Growth of inter-country trade has therefore 
to be appreciated and stepped up, because it is a movement away from 
this dependence and introduces a stabilising factor in the develop-
ment of East Africa. 
But perhaps nicsre important has been the rapid increase of manu-
factured goods in inter-country trade, for this reveals the process of 
industrialisation which has been and is taking place in East Africa. 
4. !Fpr "the purposes of this^paper the Neighbours are taken to be 
Zanzibar, Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, Congo tT-ieo/J, Rwanaa, Burundi, Zambia Malawi, Rnodesia, Mozambique, Madagascar, Mauritius, Reunion & Seychelles. 
JJJV study on inter-country t;rade was^substqmtially completed before Zanzibar jolned Tanganyika to xorm the Republic of Tansania. Thus in this paper and in my study Zanzibar is not regarded as part of Tanganyika. 
5. In both Tables all data on exports refer to goods produced or manu-factured domestically i.e. in the case of inter-country exports we exclude transfers. of foreign iKported^goods^from one East African countrv to anot-her; and in the case orexperts to the Neighbours and the rest er the world we have excluded re-exports. 
6. A large part of the tremendous increase in the value of East African 
exports to the rest of tne world was due to increases in the export ear-
nings of sisal (£10.2mn), cotton £9.4 mn), and coffee (£7.7 Lin). These 
increases resulxed from greater quantities of exports, and a minor 
recovery in the prices of robusta coffee (the prices of arabica and 
coffee actually aeclined further). However, the outlook for these 
commodities is not bright, in view of the world disequilibrium between 
their supply and demand. 


This is shör,n in Table 2. From this table we can make three major 
observations on the commodity composition of East African exports 
to the three markets: (a) while in the trade, with the Neighbours and 
the rest of the world East African exports are concentrated in 
SITC sections 0 and 2 i.e. food, and cxu.de inedible materials exc-
luding fuels, in inter-country trade exports are distributed over 
a large number of commodity sections - the most important being 
food, manufactured goods classified chiefly by material, tobacco 
and beve rages, and miscellaneous manufactured goods, in that order. 
If we take SITC section 0 - 4 to be primary products (which 
is true, although we should keep in mind that in section 0 there 
are some manufactured foods e.g. biscuits and that section 1 
includes manufactured tobacco; while section 2 includes phyrethrurn 
extract), and SITC sections 5-9 to be manufactured goods (again 
this is by and large true, although in section 6 base metals and 
diamonds are included), it will be noticed that manufactured goods 
play the greatest'part in inter-country exports. For instance 
while manufactured goods accounted for 4-8.3/j of total inter-coun-
try 
expcsr Is in 1963, the corresponding ratios in exports to the 
Neighbours and the rest of the world were only 25.1^ and 9.3% res-
pectiveiy. Actually in the latter case this ratio would have 
been very small indeed if exports of diamonds, copper, and gold 
(worth slightly over £10.4 millionin 1963) were excluded. In 
fact taking both the'Neighbours and the rest of the world together 
we notice that if we exclude diamonds, copper and gold, exports of 
manufactured goods to these two markets were only a third of the 
value of manufactured inter-country 'exports — or about £5 million 
compared with well over £15 mn. (c) _ It will also be noticed from 
table 2 that it hä's been in inter-country exports that sübstantial 
shifts in the relative importance of various SITC sections have 
taken place in the period 1959-65,with manufactured goods becoming 
increasingly more impoi-tant. Manufactured goods for instance, 
have increased their relative share in total inter-country expor'ts 
from 32.7% in 1959 to 48,5% in 1963,'while in exports to the Neig-
hbours (and these are countries at broadly the same stage of aevelc-
"pment as East Africa) the increase has been only from 19.6% to 23.I/J; 
• and in the case of • exports to the rest of the world the percen-
tage share of manufactured goods actually declined slightly in this 
"period. 'It will also be noticed that whereas the percentage 
share of food exports in inter-country trade has declined between 
1959 and 1963, in the case of exports. to the other two markets it 
has actually increased. 
The increasing importance of manufactured goods in inter-
country trade reflects the process of import substitution that has 
been taking. place in East Africa. This import substitution has 
been achieved" under a framework of proctection — by tariff rates 
of 25-33^?. Such domestically manufactured goods as cotton 
fabric piece-goods, shoes, steel doors and windows, aluminium and 
metal Containers and Utensils, bicycle tyres and tubes, etc. enjoy 
a good measure of protection. The same is also true of certain 
foodstuffs, and beverages and cigarettes. The fact that manufac-
tured goods have become important in these exports only recently 
emphasises a point made earlier; namely that mere existence of a 
common market is of little effect in encouraging industrialisation 
unless the opportunities it offers are seized. The East African 
common market has been in existance for the last forty years; but 
it was only after World War II that inter-country trade began growing 
steadily and, as far as manufactured goods are concerned, it is 
only in the last few years that this trade has become important. 
The most rapid expansion in inter-country exports of manufactured 
goods has been in the last five years: and between 1959 and 1963 
inter-country exports in SITC sections 5-9 more than doubled in 
value. 

It should also "be observed that while inter-country imports 
of food were smaller than retained imports in 1959, by 1963 they 
were greater than the latter by about £1 million. Retained imports 
of food have actually declined over the last five years, while inter-
country imports of food have increased by £2.7 million , and we can expect 
this trend to continue, as It should because import -substitution In 
food Is often as important as import substitution in manufactured goods, 
especially where foreign imports of food are really manufactured pro-
ducts. An underdeveloped country should attempt to provide herseif 
with food requirements — so that foreign exchange is used pri-
marily for importing capital goods which are needed for Investment. 
One rather interesting thing to notice from Table 3 is that 
not only has there been a fall in the value of retained ixports 
of beverages and tobacco (SITC section l), but the value of inter-
country imports of these goods has also fallen. However, this 
fall in the value of inter-country imports of these goods should 
not be taken as indicating that East African production of these 
goods has fallen: on the contrary; there has been a remarkable 
increas© in their production, but each country is now absorbing 
an increasing proportion of its production of these items. This 
is especially true in the case of beer. 
In concluding this section we should emphasise again that 
the amount of industrialisation that has taken place in East Africa 
owes much to the larger market created by the existence of the 
common market. Taking East Africa as a whole, her population is 
more than 3g- times that of Uganda, about three times that of Kenya, 
and about 2-g- times- that »f Tanganyika. Moreover, as far as the 
mone-fcairy gross domsstio -producrb is ooäQcerneda the East African 
total is 2.4 times that of Kenya, 5.5 times that of Tanganyika, 
and 3.6 times that of Uganda. Consequently East Africa as a 
whole offers a larger market than any of the three countries 
could offer, and can therefore support.more and bigger industries. 
r r i 
In section II we have attempted, albeit too briefly and 
•inadequately, to indicate the effect of.ths common market on the 
industrialisation, through greater inter-country trade, of East 
"Africa taken as a.whole. In this section we shall discuss, again 
briefly, the effects of this common market on the development of 
each East African country. 
In general, the extent to which a participating country bene-
fits from a common market depends on whether it can substantially 
increase its exports to the other participants, and, in the case 
of an underdeveloped country aspiring to industralise, on the com-
modity composition of its exports. If a country in a common market 
or customs union just simply shifts its sources of inpoi-ts from 
third countries to the partrers and does not increase her exports 
to the latter, there is every likelihood that the country in 
question will lose in the operation of the common market — if only 
because imports from partner countries are likely to be, initially 
at least, more expensive than those from third countries. More-
over, in the case of underdeveloped countries it is likely that 
industrialisation will tend to concentrate in given areas because 
of a whole. lot of possible factors — economies of scale, concen-
tration of entrepreneurial ability in a given country, concen-
tration of high incomes, btsttes- trcmsp«r-fcc.-fcioj;>. fÄcilities, etc. 
In fact it seems as if the "polarisation effect" of a common, market 



From table 6 it vd.ll be observed that Kenya's exports to the other 
two countries consist mainly of manufactured goods (väth this trend 
pointing strongly upwards), while her imports consist mainly of primary 
products. On the other hand Tanganyika's exports are mainly primary 
products, although from 195S to 1963 the' share of manufactured goods in 
her exports increased from 10.4% to 33.85?. However, these percentages 
are misleading unless they are seen in the background of the real values 
involved. Looking at the real values of all inter-country exports and 
imports of man^ actured_.jgg_ods, in. 1963 Tanganyika's percentage shares 
in the farmer and the latter were 7.6% and 44.4% respectively, while Uganda's 
shares were 17,7% and 38.7%, and Kenya's shares 74.7% and 16^9%, again 
respectively. 
It is therefore true to say that the common market has encouraged 
industrialisation most in Kenya, and it is likely that it has held back 
setting up manufacturing industries in Tanganyika, although certainly 
not in Uganda. The word likely is most important, for it would be^wrong 
to suppose that but for the existence of the common market Tanganyika 
would now be having a large and flourishing manufacturing sector. It is 
true that the availability of a protected market has been of crucial 
importance in the emergence and expansion of some manufacturing activities 
in Kenya (for almost all Kenya's exports of manufactured goods are sold 
to the rest of East Africa); but other factors have also been important. 
For instance it is not always realised that nearly 50% of the total East 
African monetary income is in Kenya, and that Kenya actually consumes 
large proportions of the manufactured goods which she produces. In 
other words, the domestic market of Kenya has been of considerable impor-
tance in the.minor industrialisation which has taken place in that country. 
There are other factors too e.g. the concentration of Europeans and Asians 
in Kenya's main towns (and it is these two communities which have supplied 
most of the entrepreneurial ability in East Africa); the more favourable 
geographica! position of Kenya; and the fact that economically at least 
the British colonial policy tended to favour Kenya. Moreover, as far as 
the growth of each country's monetary gross domestic product is concerned, 
it should not be forgotten that after the Korean War commodity boom collapsed 
all three countries were hit hard, — -because they depend heavily on exports 
of a few primary commodities for their monetary incomes. But this depen-
dence is greater in both Uganda and Tanganyika — and greater in Tanganyika 
than in Uganda — and the latter countries were therefore hit harder than 
Kehya by the collapse of the Korean War commodity boom. 
However, this paper does not deny that the more stable and higher 
rate of economic growth in Kenya° over the last six or so years owes a 
lot to the very rapid increase in her exports to both Uganda and Tanganyika, 
For instance if between 1954- and 1963 Tanganyika's inter-country exports had 
increased by the same amount as the increase in Kenya's inter-country exports 
her monetary GDF, other things being eaual, would have been £22 million 
greater in 1963.1° Of course this is" not to suggest that either Uganda 
•or Tanganyika. would havö done much better but for the common market: what 
•tfe can say fcr certain is that these two "countries would have done better 
had their inter-country .exports increased by more than they -did. 
•9. Between 1954 and 1961 Kenya's monetary GDF increased by £64.3 mn, while Uganda's increased by £18.9 million, and Tanganyika's by £35.1 mn. However, •due to greater earnings of domestic exports m 1963, Uganda's monetary G.D.P increased frorn £107.9 million in 1962 to £128.7 million in "1963, and Tanganyika's increased from £123.3 mn to £140.3 mn: while. Kenya's increased from £180.9 rhu to only £193.3 mn. This is an additional fact to emphasise that had both L'ganda and Tanganyika:. kep.t up a reasonable rate of growth in the value of their domestic exports during* the '50s, their- monetary GDF would not have increased by so müch le&s than Kenya's, 
10, This estimate is based on some regression analysis contained in my 
fortheoming monograph
es to improve tlie': Operation of the 'Common Market. 
The history of the common market has not been a-peaceful one: 
and there have been two major controversies. The first controversy 
was in 1920s when, after the Congo Basin (Open Door Treaty) count-
tries (of which East Africa was a member) Were allowed to raise 
their tariffs above the 10?-b ceiling fixed by the Brüssels Conference 
of 1890, Kenya advocated for and achieved introduction of protec-
tive tariffs in East Africa. The first tariffs covered timber, 
sugar, wheat and wheat-flour, butter, ghee, cheese, ham and bacon. 
After these tariffs were in existence for a few years Uganda, and 
Tanganyika less energetically, attacked this policy, mainly on 
grounds of welfareü — that Kenya goods were of poor quality, 
high-priced, and that the protected industries had not proved that 
they could stand on their own even after a period of considerable 
protection. It was also claimed that Kenya's production of these 
goods could not satisfy the East African demand. However, after 
a reduction (not elimination) of these tariffs in 1930, the contro-
versy ebbed, helped by the Great Depression which undermined faith 
in free trade and laisses-faire policies even in Uganda. 
The second controversy and which is still with us started 
after the collapse of the Korean War commodity boom. In this 
controversy we can distinguish three arguments: (a) loss of economic 
sovereignty; (b) loss of revenue; and (c) unequal growth rates and 
industrialisation among the three countries. We can quickly dis-
pose of the first argument; in any common market or customs union 
where there is free movement of goods and factors of production, 
each country1 s ability to follow an entirely independent line in 
its economic policies is reduced to a greater or less extent — 
depending on its economic importance in the common market as a whole. 
This loss of sovereignty is especially serious where economic co-cpera-
tion is limited only to tariff policy, with no co-ordination in other 
development policies. In Uganda it has been clainied that her member-
ship in the common market puts her into a 'fiscal strait - jacket1 — 
which is true to an extent. However, with out going into great 
detail about this, ue can say that unless in a common market there 
is co-ordination and harmonisation of economic policies (and social 
policies in most cases) the danger of such economic Integration 
breaking up is great. This solidly applies to the East African 
common market. 
jS^ -logA.off, revenue argument. 
Allocation of revenue is always a thorny problem in a customs 
union where member countries depend heavily on customs duties for 
their revenue — as the East African countries do. It is argued 
that by importing Kenya goods (because Uganda and Tanganyika have 
not expanded their inter-country expcrts as much as Kenya has done 
— as we saw earlier) instead of foreign ones, Uganda and Tanganyika 
lose revenue in the process, while Kenya maintains her revenue 
through proceeds from income tax levied on income derived free: import 
substitution activit-ies. 
11. For Uganda's arguments in this controversy see Uganda Govern-
ment, Report of the Tariff Committee, November, 1929. Entebbe, Uganda 
did, however, recognise the importance of maintaining the customs 
union, and'pointed out that considerable effort should be made to 
"ensure that there shall be a customs union in fact as well as in name" 
For Kenya*s arguments, see Kenya Government, Repcsrt of the 
Tariff Committee, May 1929. Nairobil 
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This argpsaerrfc isas saae sabstance, "trat it' hcs "been erKxrrjously 
exaggerated. A crude method of estinating each country* s loss of 
revenue is to take her exports to the rest of East Africa and multiply 
these by the appropriate rate of dutyhad the rest of Sast Africa 
•irported these goods fron foreign countries (call this A)j.then do the 
same for_ the icports of the country'' in question from the rest of East 
Africa (call this B); and then substract A Ironi B. This method is 
not satisfactory because it rests on the.assumption that income 
levels, patterns and levels of consumption in each country would 
have been the same had there been no common market- This would 
be a very brave assumption. However, it was attempted - a most 
laborious job for the calculation had to be done for each dutiable 
commodity. Unfortunately, it was not found easy to deal with 
excisable commodities — for two reasons: (i) excise taxes change 
frequently and, in the case of cigarettes (the Chief commodity in the 
excisable goods), excise tax rates are given by specifications which 
are not published in the available trade data; (ii) in most cases excise 
taxes are much lower than exteraal tariff: for instance in the case 
of cigarettes the average excise tax for 1962 works out to be about 
Shs.15 per pound, while the external tariff is Shs.44 per pound i.e. 
a difference of Shs.29 per pound. If then a calculation was made 
for cigarettes, Tanganyika. would have appeared to have. lost more 
than £4.4 million in 1962. Even after.subtracting excise tax 
revenue on cigarettes which Tanganyika received from these imports 
(excise tax revenue is given to the consuming country) Tanganyika 
would .still appear to have lost more than£3 million. It was 
feit therefore that our assumption that consunption levels would 
have been the same was so unrealististic.in the case of excisable 
Commodities that we decided not to include SITC section 1 (this 
section includes most of the excisable goods) in our final estimates, 
This is reas'onable, because in the case of cigarettes for instance 
an application of füll external duty vrould have more than doubled 
the price of various brands of cigarettes, and it would be most 
unrealistic to expect that consumption of. cigarettes vrould have 
been. the same even at these high parices. 
When the calculation on dutiable non-excisable commodities was 
carried out for 1962, it was found.that Tanganyika's loss of revenue 
.was £1.366" million, and Uganda's loss £664.000. These figures are 
smaller than one would Inf er from the volume and intensity of the 
1 . . controv'ersy centred on this point: it is not often realised that 
some of these two countries1 inter-country exports to Kenya e.g. 
onions and non-leather shoes from Tanganyika and cotton fabric 
piecegoods from Uganda, carry high rates of duty if imported from 
abroad. 
The problem of loss of revenue to these two countries is now 
being solved to an extent by the use of the Raisman Formula,-^ but 
this should be regarded as a terrporary device, if only because it 
stresses the revenue problem instead of the more fundamental develop-
ment problem. of each country. This brings us to the.third argument 
— unequal growth rates. 
Unequal Orowth Rates. 
It has already been indicated that Kenya has been indust-
rialising faster than eigher Uganda or Tanganyika. It has also 
been errphasised that Kenya's more rapid growth owes its existence 
to other factors, besides the common market. However, it has 
become clear that the present differences are politically unaooeut-
able and that unless the other two countries are somehow 
1'2. See Report of the Economic and Fiscal Commission, K.M.S.O. 
Cmnd. 1279. "February, 1961. 
the opportunity to set up industries, the common market is in great 
dang er of breaking up. Where there are unequal growth rates 
among members of a common market and where it is feit that the 
common market is increasing the existing disparities, there are 
three courses of action which can be taken: (i) a complete break-up 
of the common market; (ii) a dilution of the common market; or 
(iii) closer economic Integration. In East Africa, if a complete 
break-up occurs it is certain that each country would lose, and 
it is not improbable that Tanganyika. and Uganda would löse more 
in the long-ran even if it might appear that there are some short-
run benefits. Moreover, we also need to point out that if the 
common market breaks up it is exceedingly unlikely that the common 
services now being ran by EACSO would continue to be operated 
jointly for very long, and this would be a very serious loss, 
especially to both Uganda and Tanganyika. Therefore, if rapid 
growth rates are to be achieved in each country, considerable 
effort and sacrifice should be made to avoid a break-up of the 
existing economic Integration. 
The above conclusion leaves us with alternatives (ii) and 
(iii). To start with the dilution of the common market: because 
of the existence of the common market, aided by the existence of a 
common currency and close physical proximity, each country is now 
unable to use in füll some of the Instruments, usually available 
to a Single country, for its industrialisation programme. Such 
instruments include Company taxation, monetary policy, and tariff 
policy. These are noc? more or less uniform in East Africa, and it 
is possible that perhaps Uganda and Tanganyika could benefit, even 
if only slightly, if they followed policies likely to make them 
more attractive than Kenya — as long as Kenya did not retaliate, 
a most unlikely assumption. Moreover, the possibility of 
attracting large-scale industries into Uganda and Tanganyika 
withoüt giving these industries access to the Kenya market should 
be heavily discounted. We are therefore left with. the last 
alternative i.e. closer economic integration which would, paradoxi-
cally, allow some kind of dilution of the common market to take 
pla.ce in favour of Uganda and Tanganyika with out breaking up the 
common mertet altogether. 
The fact that the present strains and tensions in the common 
market call for, if each country is to benefit in the long-run, 
closer economic integration rests on the fact that such closer 
integration would allow co-ordinated economic policies and planned 
Intervention to be introduced in favour of those areas lagging 
behind. The truth is that most of the-present tensions and 
strains in the common market arise from the fact that although 
there is a common market there is not as yet a common economic 
policy. A common economic policy should have, as one of its 
main objectives, planned aistribution (through various possible 
devices) of industry throughout East Africa, Strong emphasis 
should be laid on therword distribution, not redistributior; for 
even Kenya is not really an industrialised country and there are 
very few (if any) industries which can be redistributed. In 
other words the policy adopted should be dynamic, rather than 
static, and should be designed to distribute industries within 
a framework of general economic expansion in this vjhole area. 
The possibility of success if such a policy v/ere adopted is great; 
for the scope of further import substitution on an East African 
basis Is very great in relation to the amount achieved so far. 
Just looking at some goods which East Africa produces but not 
in enough quantities so that she still has to import from abroad 
in arder to meet domestic demand for them, we get the following: 
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